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History and Practice of Executive
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1972, Congress passed the Federal Impoundment and In-
formation Act.' On February 5, 1973, Roy L. Ash, then director-
designate of the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), de-
livered the first report2 required by the Act, indicating budget
reserves in effect as of January 29, 1973: approximately $8.7 bil-
lion was, according to the OMB, being withheld from obligation.
But the total did not reflect that about $5 billion which was to be
spent for water pollution control3 was impounded.4 The actual re-
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1. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-599, § 401, 86 Stat. 1325. In
pertinent part, the Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 581c-1 (Supp. July 1973), requires
the President to submit reports to the Congress and Comptroller
General detailing certain information concerning funds which are
appropriated and partially or completely impounded. The reports,
which must be published in the Federal Register, are to indicate (1)
the amount of funds impounded; (2) the date on which funds were
ordered to be impounded; (3) the date the funds were impounded;
(4) the department to which the funds would be available except for
such impoundment; (5) the period of time the funds are to be im-
pounded; (6) the reasons for impoundment, and (7) the estimated
fiscal, economic and budgetary effect of impoundment, to the extent
this is ascertainable.
2. 38 Fed. Reg. 3474 (1973).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Acts Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973). The struggle over the purse-strings to
these funds has been understandably vehement. The chief sponsor of
the 1972 provisions, Senator Edmund Muskie, insisted that Congress
clearly wanted the water pollution control funds spent:
How could we be clearer? We enacted that legislation by a
unanimous vote in the Senate [and] by a unanimous vote in
the House. The legislation went to the House-Senate Con-
ference, came back to both houses [and] was overwhelmingly
approved. The President vetoed it at midnight [on] one of
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serve of about $15 billion 5 far exceeded the amount impounded by
any other President.
Each year since first assuming office, President Nixon has im-
pounded 17-20 per cent of controllable funds" appropriated by
Congress. Nearly $12 billion appropriated for the building of high-
ways 7 and pollution control projects8 has been withheld. Hun-
dreds of millions of dollars appropriated for medical research,
higher education, rural electrification, rural environmental assist-
ance, public housing, urban renewal and myriad other programs9
the last days of the session. And within 24 hours, both the
House and the Senate had overridden it. The President got
only 12 votes in the Senate and 23 votes in the House to sup-
port his veto. Now, how many times, may I ask, must Con-
gress speak before our intention is clear?
The Advocates, Public Broadcasting Service, WGBH-Boston, (tran-
script), Feb. 15, 1973, at 11. See notes 119-29 and accompanying text
infra.
4. On Dec. 8, 1972, the Environmental Protection Agency announced that
"in accordance with the President's letter of November 22, 1972" it
was allotting among the states $5 billion less than the amount re-
quired by the Act. 37 Fed. Reg. 26,282 (1972). See 119 CONG. REC.
S638 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1973) (prepared statement of Senator Nelson).
5. See Indianapolis Star, Feb. 6, 1973, at 3, col. 3. There has been con-
siderable controversy about the total amount impounded. Note, Im-
poundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505-06 n.2 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Impoundment].
6. Compare OMB figures in Hearings on Executive Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Power
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-13
(1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings], with figures set out by
Boggs, Executive Impoundment of Congressionally Appropriated
Funds, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 221, 226 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Boggs].
But see Hearings on Impoundment Reporting and Review Before the
House Comm. on Rules, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 82 (1973)
(testimony of Representative Cederberg), where, based upon the
erroneous 0MB reports, it is contended that President Nixon has
impounded a much lower percent of total outlays than have other
recent Presidents.
7. For a detailed discussion, see notes 88-117 and accompanying text
infra.
8. Note 4 supra.
9. E.g., the President has withheld: (1) over $70 million of HIUD's
"312" housing rehabilitation loan program funds within the past two
years, see 119 CONG. REc. H381 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1973) (remarks of
Representative Drinan); (2) nearly $18 million of funds appropriated
to implement the Indian Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1211a et seq.
(Supp. 1973), see Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v. Carlucci, 358 F. Supp.
973 (D.D.C. 1973); and (3) all funds, after Jan. 19, 1971, appropriated
to complete the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, which was, at the time
funds were impounded, one-third completed and on which $50 million
had been spent, see 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 53 (testimony of
Representative Bennett). On Dec. 19, 1973, Deputy Press Secre-
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have been impounded. And, in part due to his notions about the
constitutional and statutory viability of executive impoundment
and his 1974 Budget Message,10 President Nixon precipitated a
crisis of some magnitude. The nature of the funds and amounts
impounded have been without precedent.
The rationale President Nixon developed to justify impound-
ments have been novel. One example of these rationale is the
reason the President gave, in part, for vetoing H.R. 3298,11 a bill
designed to revive federal grants for rural water and sewer projects
which the President terminated on January 1, 1973, through the
impoundment of funds. In vetoing H.R. 3298 on April 5, 1973, the
President indicated that the measure raised a "grave constitu-
tional question" because it purported to mandate spending the full
amount appropriated by Congress.' 2 The President explained that
the Attorney General had advised him that such a mandate "con-
flicts with the allocation of executive power to the President made
by Article II of the Constitution."' 3
The legislative and judicial responses to the impoundments have
been speedy, though not yet dispositive of the several ramifica-
tions of the 1973 impoundment crisis.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IMPOUNDMENT
Executive impoundment' 4 of appropriated funds is not a re-
cent phenomenon. The first major instance of executive impound-
ment appears to have been in 1803 when President Jefferson refused
to spend $50,000 appropriated by Congress.' 5 Thirty-five years la-
tary Gerald L. Warren announced that President Nixon had ordered
the release of $1.1 billion in impounded health and education funds.
The Lincoln Star, Dec. 20, 1973, at 24, col. 6.
10. H.R. Doc. No. 15, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see also Melloan, Dr.
Nixon's Painful Prescription, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 1973, at
20, col. 4.
11. H.R. 3298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
12. 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 863-64.
13. Id. See notes 145-55 and accompanying text infra.
14. The term "impoundment" is normally used in a generic sense. It can
refer to reserving, withholding, delaying, freezing or sequestering ap-
propriated funds or deferring the allocation of funds. 1971 Hearings,
supra note 6, at 1 (testimony of Senator Ervin); Fisher, Funds Im-
pounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 124 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Fisher] ("In its broadest
context, impoundment occurs whenever the President spends less than
Congress appropriates for a given period."). See S. 373, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 4 (1973), which on May 10, 1973, passed in the Senate by
a vote of 86-4. 119 CONG. REc. S8871 (daily ed. May 10, 1973).
15. In his third annual message to Congress, on Oct. 17, 1803, President
Jefferson stated that, "The sum of fifty thousand dollars appropriated
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ter the United States Supreme Court decided the first case in which
it discussed, tangentially, the practice of impoundment. President
Jackson's Postmaster General refused to pay a contract claim of
one who had rendered services by carrying mail. Congress passed
private legislation authorizing payment of the claim; and Kendall
v. United States ex rel. Stokes16 held that the Postmaster General,
an official of the executive branch, could not refuse the "purely
ministerial" duty of paying the claim. The Court firmly rejected
the notion that the President's obligation to see the laws faithfully
executed carried with it an implied power to forbid execution.17
Kendall did not, as foes of impoundment some times assert,18
establish the lack of presidential control over appropriated funds.
Rather, as the Department of Justice recently indicated,' 9 the 1838
Kendall decision established that mandamus will lie to compel the
performance of a non-discretionary duty to pay prior contractual
obligations.20
Chief Justice Taney and Justices Barbour and Catron dissented
in Kendall. They did not dissent because they felt the majority
view would impinge upon presidential authority. The crux of the
dissents was that inferior federal courts had no jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus. 2' Moreover, an examination of the Congres-
by Congress for providing gun boats remains unexpended. The
favorable and peaceable turn of affairs on the Mississippi rendered
immediate execution of that law unnecessary ... " 13 ANNALS OF
CONG. 14 (1803).
16. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
17. Id. at 610-13.
18. E.g., Memorandum on the Legality of the Department of Agriculture's
Termination of the Rural Electrification Act Two Percent Loan Pro-
gram from Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., to the National Rural
Electric Cooperation Association, Jan. 22, 1973, at 11-12 [hereinafter
cited as Arnold & Porter Memorandum]. The Memorandum makes
the dubious assertion that the Kendall decision "firmly established
that the President's power, if any, to spend or not to spend appro-
priated funds derives from legislatively delegated powers and is
not inherent in Article II of the Constitution. . . ." Id. at 11. See
1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 39 (testimony of Representative
Bennett) (cautiously relying on Kendall).
19. See Joint Hearings on S. 373 before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Im-
poundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Opera-
tions and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 836 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
1973 Hearings].
20. See Church, Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of
Congressional Control Over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1240, 1249 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Church]; Fischer, supra note
14, at 126-27.
21. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 627 (Taney, C.J., dissenting), 642 (Barbour, J.,
dissenting), 653 (Catron, J., concurring with Taney and Barbour).
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sional Globe 22 for the year following the Kendall decision reveals
that no senator or representative suggested the Supreme Court had
rendered an opinion treating of congressional or presidential au-
thority vis-a-vis the power of the purse.
Further indication that the Supreme Court in Kendall did not
find a lack of presidential control over appropriated funds is the
case of Decatur v. PauZding,23 where, only two years after Kendall,
the Court upheld the Secretary of Navy's refusal to pay a widow's
claim based on a congressional resolution. After discussing Ken-
dall, the Court opined that the Secretary of Navy's duty to pay, un-
like the Postmaster General's ministerial act involved in Kendall,
required discretion and judgment and would not allow mandamus.2 4
At best, Kendall can be said to have indirectly set forth an outer
parameter for executive discretion.25
Every President from George Washington to Richard Nixon has
almost certainly impounded appropriated funds. The very early
instances of impoundment were largely attributable to the fact
that, unlike today, appropriations bills "were quite general in their
terms and, by obvious ... intent, left to the President ... the
[power] for determining . . . in what particular manner the funds
would be spent."26 The first truly significant withholding of
22. 25th Cong., 3d Sess. (1838-39), 26th Cong., 1st Sess. (1839-40).
23. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
24. Id. at 516-17. Had the Court not taken the position that discretion was
involved, the result would have been inequitable since the widow
would have received a pension from the resolution and another from
a general pension bill.
25. See also United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
284, 304 (1854); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290 (1850).
26. 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 233 (testimony of Assistant Attorney
General Rehnquist). One distinguished constitutional law scholar
has indicated that the Constitution "assumes that expenditure is
primarily an executive function, and conversely that the participa-
tion of the legislative branch is essential for the purpose simply of
setting bounds to executive discretion-a theory confirmed by early
practice .... " E. CoRwnT, THE PREsinmrT: OnMCE. AND POWERS, 1787-
1957, at 127-28 (4th ed. 1957).
A controversy over budget itemization and executive discretion
took place as early as Jefferson's presidency. Alexander Hamilton
and Albert Gallatin insisted that specific sums for specific purposes
were unwise since Congress could not forsee contingencies the Presi-
dent might encounter. Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin suggested
that "a reasonable discretion [over appropriated moneys] should be
allowed" to the proper executive department. 3 Tnm Wm=nxGs oF
ALBERT GAuLAnx 117 (H. Adams ed. 1879). Although Jefferson had
in the first years of his presidency wanted specific appropriations, he
later thought it better for Congress to appropriate funds in gross,
leaving wide latitude for executive discretion. 4 Tim WaR=mGs OF
THoiA.s JEFrRsoN 529-30, 533 (H. Washington ed. 1854).
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funds, however, took place in 1876 during President Grant's admin-
istration. Upon signing a measure which appropriated funds for
harbor and river improvements, 2 7 President Grant sent a special
message to the House of Representatives in which he indicated that
he did not plan to spend the total amount because, in his view, cer-
tain appropriations were for "works of purely private or local inter-
est, in no sense national." "[D] uring my term of office," the Presi-
dent declared, "no public money shall be expended upon them. ' 28
Another reason Grant gave to justify impounding the funds was
revenue deficiencies, and the President suggested that no expendi-
tures might be made except for "works already done and paid for."
He added, "Under no circumstances will I allow expenditures upon
works not clearly national. '29
President Grant's message drew some heated remarks in the
House: "What right has this great Caesar to decide," Representa-
tive Hereford asked, "what are and what are not national, when
the American Congress has decided the question by making these
appropriations. On what meat hath this our Caesar fed?" 3 0 Here-
ford continued:
What right . . . has [President Grant] to say to us as he does to-
day, "I will not carry out the law; I notify you in advance I will
nullify and set at nought a law of Congress .... I notify you I
will not carry it out unless in so far as it may suit my views." 31
Few Congressmen said anything about the planned impoundment,
but most who did speak on the matter sided with the President. 32
Representative Pierce's remarks likely reflected the views of most:
"There is nothing mandatory in [the legislation]. It does not say
that he shall spend a single dollar .... -33
Pursuant to President Grant's instructions, Secretary of War
Cameron and the Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers refused to
spend $2.7 million of the $5 million which had been appropriated
by Congress. 34 The House of Representatives responded by pass-
ing a resolution asking the President to indicate the legal authority
for impounding the funds. The Secretary of War replied that the
language of the appropriations act was "in no way mandatory" and
that it was not fiscally practical or legally appropriate for the
27. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 267, 19 Stat. 132.
28. 4 CONG. REC. 5628 (1876).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5630 (original emphasis).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5630-33 (remarks of Representatives Conger, Pierce and Kas-
son).
33. Id. at 5632 (original emphasis).
34. H. EXEc. Doc. No. 23, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 56 (1876).
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President's discretion to be otherwise limited than by the "inter-
ests of the public service" and the "condition of the Treasury."
The matter of harbor and river funds impoundment was quickly
dropped by Congress, and no efforts were made to restrict presi-
dential discretion over the appropriated money. President Grant's
action is, for historical purposes if no other reason, important be-
cause it was very likely the first instance 35 in which a President
withheld large sums for any reason other than to prevent waste.
Although a few court decisions made during the late 1800s are
at times cited for3 6 or against 37 the proposition that executive im-
poundment of funds is constitutionally permissible, it has been ad-
equately demonstrated that the decisions constitute meager author-
ity on the matter.38 Some pertinent opinions of the United States
Attorney General were made, however; and a statute of vital rele-
vance was enacted in the early 1900s.
From 1896 through 1899, two United States Attorney Generals,
Judson Harmon and John W. Griggs, issued four formal opinions
on the subject of executive impoundment of appropriated funds.
35. A careful examination of the 1971 and 1973 Hearings on impound-
ment, supra notes 6 and 19, reveals that several people think that
impoundment itself began either in the 1920s under President Harding
or in the 1940s under President Rossevelt. Although the practice
perhaps began with our first President, it was in any event started no
later than 1803. Note 15 and accompanying text supra.
36. E.g., Compagna v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 316 (1891); Hukill v.
United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 562 (1880). Both cases were relied upon
in a 1967 Attorney General's Opinion for the proposition that "[t]he
courts have recognized that appropriation acts are of a fiscal and
permissive nature and do not in themselves impose upon the executive
branch an affirmative duty to spend the funds." 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN.,
No. 32, at 4 (1967).
37. E.g., United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249 (1898); United States
v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885). These cases are repeatedly cited for the
proposition that the Treasury cannot refuse to make payments when
Congress has appropriated funds to pay a certain amount to a
specified person. Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emp. v. Phillips,
358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973); Arnold & Porter Memorandum, supra
note 18, at 12; 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 147 (testimony to Repre-
sentative Bennett); Davis, Congressional Power to Require Defense
Expenditures, 33 FoRDHA-vI L. REv. 39, 54 n.91 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Davis].
38. See Arnold & Porter Memorandum, supra note 18, at 19; Fisher, supra
note 14, at 127; Ramsey, Impoundment by the Executive Department
of Funds which Congress has Authorized It to Spend or Obligate 15
(Legislative Reference Service, May 10, 1968); 1973 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 362 (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Sneed); 1971
Hearings, supra note 6, at 45-49 (the lively colloquy among Professors
Miller and Bickel, Representative Bennett and Senator Udall).
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In all four opinions the Attorney General unequivocally stated
that the intent of Congress, not necessarily the specific statutory
language used, was to be the critical factor in determining whether
expenditure of funds was permissive or mandatory.
When asked by Secretary of War Lamont whether the language
"there may be expended ... not exceeding fifty thousand, or so
much thereof as may be necessary" meant that "the expenditure
of the amount [was] left to the discretion of the Secretary of
War," 9 Attorney General Harmon answered affirmatively. How-
ever, the opinion specifically drew Secretary Lamont's attention to
the condition" that Congress wanted corrected and stated: "[I] t is
made your duty, if that condition be found. . . to proceed with the
expenditure authorized if ... an improvement of that condition
may fairly be expected to result. '4 1
On September 29, 1896, approximately two months after issu-
ing the above opinion, the Attorney General again responded to a
query posed by Secretary of War Lamont.42 This time the query
concerned a statute which provided that, of the sum appropriated
in a river and harbor act, a certain amount "shall be expended"
for a specified project.48 The Attorney General indicated that, in
spite of "the emphatic language in the proviso, '44 a direction to
expend funds was not mandatory "to the extent that... the work
can be done for less" or if work was not recommended by the Mis-
sissippi River Commission.45 Attorney General Harmon suggested
that this construction of the statute was necessary to be "in har-
mony . . . [with] the purpose of Congress. .".."46 In construing
the same statute ten days later 4 7 vis-a-vis the contract authority of
the Secretary of War, the Attorney General advised Secretary La-
mont: "[Y] ou should proceed with the projects specified to the ex-
tent of the appropriations without inquiry as to their wisdom. '48
In early 1899, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman L. Gage asked
Attorney General Griggs whether it was mandatory for the Treas-
ury to pay a brewer $13,500 which had been appropriated for that
purpose by Congress, although no claim had been adjudicated, or
39. 21 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 391, 392 (1896) (emphasis added).
40. The statute recited that the east bank of the Mississippi River was
caving in and washing away at a certain point. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. 21 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 414 (1896).
43. Id. at 414. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 416.
45. Id. at 415.
46. Id. at 416.
47. 21 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 420 (1896).
48. Id. at 422.
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whether the act left it to the Secretary's "discretion and judgment
to decide upon the facts whether such amount or any portion
thereof ought to be paid. .. . -49 The appropriations statute con-
tained the words "to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to pay
.... 50 Although the Attorney General noted that "to enable" was
permissive, it was his opinion that the language was intended as
mandatory because the phrase was "so frequently employed
throughout"51 the statute. Attorney General Griggs held that "to
enable" must be "read as mandatory whenever to do so is more in
harmony with the context."52 The context was to govern the con-
struction, and Attorney General Griggs found that only a mandatory
construction could be squared with congressional intent.
Undoubtedly prompted by budget deficits caused by the Span-
ish-American War, the Panama Canal and several pension bills, as
well as the river and harbor projects of the late 1800s and early
1900s, Congress passed the Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 1906. 58
The Acts provided a technique to avoid excessive expenditures in
one portion of a year that could require deficiency or supplemental
appropriations and stipulated that expenditure of appropriated
funds could be waived in the event of extraordinary emergencies
which could not be foreseen when appropriations were made. Pro-
cedures for impounding funds pursuant to the Anti-Deficiency Acts
were formalized during the Harding Administration shortly after
the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,54 but large
scale impoundment on a regular basis did not begin until the lat-
ter part of World War 11. 55
49. 22 Op. ATr'Y Gxi. 295, 296 (1899).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 297.
52. Id.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970); Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch. 510, § 3, 34 Stat. 48;
Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1257. In 1971, Senator Mathias
remarked, "[Tihe original act was for one purpose and one purpose
only, for the building of reserves, for a sound fiscal management pro-
gram. I feel sure it has gone very far afield from that." Assistant
Comptroller General Kellar agreed. 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at
257. See also Impoundment, supra note 5, at 1517-18.
54. Act of June 10, 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20. See also H.R. Doc. No. 1006,
65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918), where a national budget system was
outlined.
55. See generally J. WILLTAms, THE Impou=mrDa or FUmD sY THE BuREAU
OF TnE BuinGE (ICP Case Series No. 28, 1955) [hereinafter cited as
WILLTAms] (the best practical commentary on impoundment during
the war years). Earlier, the Economy Acts of 1932 and 1933 author-
ized the President to reduce the compensation of federal employees,
make layoffs and economize by reorganizing executive departments.
Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 212, § 403, 47 Stat. 1518; Act of June 30, 1932,
ch. 314, § 101, 47 Stat. 399. The 1933-34 War Appropriation Act ex-
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President Roosevelt impounded funds in the 1930s in order to
cope with the emergencies of economic depression and war.56
Clamor of some magnitude developed in Congress, however, in the
early 1940s when Budget Director Smith57 ordered impoundment
of amounts ranging from $1.6 million to $95 million which had been
appropriated for the Civilian Conservation Corps' surplus labor
force, civilian pilot training projects, the Surplus Marketing Corpo-
ration and various civil and military efforts which the War De-
partment could not complete because the projects did not have the
requisite priority ratings to obtain scarce resources. The public
cry and political fighting were greatest, though, when funds ap-
propriated for a flood control reservoir at Markham Ferry, Okla-
homa, and a flood control levee on the Arkansas River at Tulsa
were impounded.58
The 1940-41 impoundments set the stage for the first strong con-
gressional response: In mid-1943, Congress passed a measure50
which prohibited any agency or official other than the Commis-
sioner of Public Roads from impounding funds appropriated as
federal aid for the construction of certain highways. Hence, Con-
gress managed to slightly curtail the power of the Budget Bureau
by routing funds to avoid its tight-fisted Director.60 Another later
major effort to control the purse-strings, however, failed. On De-
cember 16, 1943, the House of Representatives defeated, 283-13, a
powerfully worded anti-impoundment rider to the First Supple-
mental Natonal Defense Appropriation Bill.6 ' The rider had
passed the Senate eight days earlier by voice vote.
6 2
pressly authorized the impoundment of funds determined unneeded
pursuant to an economy survey ordered by the President. Act of
Mar. 4, 1933, ch. 281, § 4, 47 Stat. 1602.
56. See WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 7-8.
57. It has been suggested that the Bureau of the Budget, now the OMB,
became a "major device for presidential control" over executive
agencies after the Bureau was moved to the Executive Office of the
President in 1939. N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 89 (1964).
58. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 55.
59. Act of July 13, 1943, ch. 236, § 9, 57 Stat. 563.
60. See 89 CONG. REc. 6309, 6313 (1943) (remarks of Senators McKellar,
Hayden and Vandenberg).
61. H.R. 3598, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. § 305 (1943).
62. 89 CONG. REC. 10,419 (1943) (Senate approved § 305); id. at 10,781
(House rejected § 305). Objections to § 305, Senator McKellar's pro-
posed rider to the Defense Appropriation Bill, were almost exclusively
based on the ground that the proviso would interfere with President
Roosevelt's power as Commander-in-Chief to develop priorities which
would prevent waste and allow the energetic and successful prosecu-
tion of war efforts. Id. at 10,362 (remarks of Senator Truman); id.
at 10,405, 10,419 (remarks of Senator Lodge); id. at 10,780-81 (remarks
of Representatives Cannon and Tabor). See Letter from Secretary
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At the end of World War II, appropriated funds of several bil-
lions of dollars remained in excess of military needs. 63 Due to this
and other pressures,6 4 Congress accepted a rider to the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 195165 which amended the Anti-Deficiency
Acts by adding language to expressly allow for reserves to be es-
tablished for various reasons. The 1950 amendment states:
In apportioning any appropriation, reserves may be established
to provide for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings
are made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater
efficiency of operations, or other developments subsequent to the
date on which such apportionment was made available.66
The above proviso has subsequently become the main authority
cited for justifying executive impoundment of funds67 even though
the House of Representatives lucidly declared that the measure was
not to be used to abrogate congressional intent.68
After the economic chaos caused by depression and the eco-
of War Henry L. Stimson to Senator McKellar, Dec. 7, 1943, reprinted
in id. at 10,360; WmLiAms, supra note 55, at 11; see also Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); Fisher, The Politics of Im-
pounded Funds, 15 A. ScI. Q. 361, 364-65 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Fisher H].
63. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 125; Hearings on the Supplemental Ap-
propriations Bill for 1951 Before a Subcomm. on Department of De-
fense Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 120, 233 (1950).
64. See Fisher II, supra note 62, at 370.
65. Act of Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, 64 Stat. 595.
66. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (c) (2) (1970). See 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at
105-09 (attachment to the prepared statement of Comptroller Gen-
eral Staats).
67. See Boggs, supra note 6, at 224; 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 271,
284, 286, 502 (testimony of OMB Director Ash). Cf. 38 Fed. Reg.
3474 (1973), where information released pursuant to the Federal
Impoundment and Information Act indicated that the alleged reason
for most impoundments was that existing tax laws and the statutory
limitation on the national debt would not provide sufficient funds
during the fiscal year to cover total outlays contemplated by the
individual acts of Congress.
68. The House declared that it was justifiable and proper to effectuate
savings whenever possible but added the following caution:
[T!here is no warrant or justification for the thwarting of a
major policy of Congress by the impounding of funds. If this
principle of thwarting the will of Congress by the impound-
ing of funds should be accepted as correct, then Congress
would be totally incapable of carrying out its constitutional
mandate and providing for the defense of the nation.
H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1950). See also 38 ComP.
GEN. 501, 502 (1959); 36 ComP. GEN. 699 (1957); Staff Memorandum
on S. 3578 for the Committee on Government Operations, June 23, 1958,
reprinted in 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 527, 528-33.
12 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 1 (1974)
nomic turbulence precipitated by World War II had subsided, Pres-
idents continued to impound large amounts of appropriated
funds.69 Until President Johnson's Administration, however, the
exercise of impoundment power-as distinguished from some sup-
posed impoundment authority-was tempered with a high degree
of consistency and shrouded by at least some small vestige of con-
stitutional legitimacy, viz. the power of the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief. 0 The prime instances of impoundment during
Harry Truman's presidency were the withholding of funds appro-
priated for a 70-group Air Force 1 and the giant aircraft carriers
U.S.S. United States 2 and U.S.S. Forrestal.73 President Eisen-
hower impounded funds which had been appropriated for various
defense projects,74 most noticeably including funds for strategic
airlift aircraft and initial procurements of Nike-Zeus hardware.
President Kennedy's major impoundment controversy centered
about the RS-70, a long-range bomber. Congress appropriated
nearly two times the amount that the President had requested, and
Secretary of Defense McNamara refused to release the excess funds
and emphasized that America's missile deterrence capability com-
bined with existing bomber strength was more than adequate.
Later, the House Armed Services Committee voted to direct utili-
zation of an amount not less than $491,000 for the RS-70 and de-
69. See Fisher II, supra note 62, at 366-69.
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
71. See 95 CONG. REc. 14,355 (remarks of Senator Thomas); id. at 14,855
(remarks of Senators Ferguson and Salstonsall); Hearings on the
National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1950 Before
the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1949)
[hereinafter 1949 Hearings] (testimony of Secretary of the Air Force
Symington); Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of
Defense Louis A. Johnson, Nov. 8, 1949, reprinted in 1971 Hearings,
supra note 6, at 525 (directing that funds be placed in reserve). The
debates in Congress and testimony taken in the hearings suggest that
President Truman did not exactly thwart the will of Congress. The
Senate was quite reluctant to vote for the extra funds and did so
mainly to avoid an impasse created by the House vote.
72. See 1949 Hearings, supra note 71, at 162 (testimony of Admiral Den-
feld); see also W. MiLLis, THE FoRRESTA Dmums 392-93, 464-77 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as W. M]MLIS].
73. 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 98 (testimony of Comptroller General
Staats). See also W. MiLLis, supra note 72, at 464-77.
74. In 1956, $46.4 million appropriated to increase Marine Corps personnel
strength was impounded; in 1959, $48 million in Hound-Dog missile
funds, $90 million in Minuteman program funds, $55.6 million for
additional KC-135 tankers, $140 million for additional strategic air-
lift aircraft and other funds were withheld; in 1960, $35 million for
advanced procurements for nuclear-powered carriers and $137 million
in Nike-Zeus procurement funds were impounded. 1971 Hearings,
supra note 6, at 526.
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elared that if the language commanding expenditure "constitutes
a test as to whether Congress has the power to so mandate, let the
test be made .... "75 Thereupon the President wrote a letter to
Representative Vinson,70 the Committee Chairman, requesting that
the language be made permissive rather than mandatory, and Con-
gress acceded.
The Special Counsel to President Eisenhower 77 and the Counsel
to President KennedyTs strongly advised against impounding
funds for domestic programs, but both Presidents did so in a few
instances3 9 President Johnson, however, refused to allow the ex-
75. H.R. REP. No. 1406, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1962).
76. The letter stated, in pertinent part:
I would respectfully suggest that, in place of the word
"directed," the word "authorized" would be more suitable
to an authorizing bill (which is not an appropriation of funds)
and more clearly in line with the spirit of the Constitution.
Each branch of the Government has a responsibility to
"preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution and the clearseparation of legislative and executive powers requires it. I
must, therefore, insist upon the full powers and discretions
essential to the faithful execution of my responsibilities as
President and Commander-in-Chief, under article II, section
2 and 3, of the Constitution.Letter from President John F. Kennedy to Representative Carl
Vinson, Mar. 20, 1962, in 108 CONG. REC. 4694 (1962). See id. at 4645
(remarks of Senator Goldwater); id. at 4714 (remarks of Senator
Ford); Church, supra note 20, at 1246-47; see generally Davis, supra
note 37; Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense:
The Case Against Impounding of Weapons System Appropriations, 57
GEo. L.J. 1159 (1969).
77. In a letter dated Aug. 12, 1955, to a member of Congress, the Special
Counsel to President Eisenhower stated:
Because of the President's Constitutional obligation to
faithfully execute the laws, I am strongly of the view that
when Congress has appropriated funds for a particular project,
that the President cannot set aside the will of Congress and
direct that no funds be spent on that project.
It is true that in the past Presidents have declined to
spend funds appropriated .... but I have not found any
instance of this that did not relate to funds appropriated for
the national defense .... These national defense precedents,
however, cannot, in my opinion, be used as precedents for
withholding funds appropriated for a non-defense purpose.Quoted in Memorandum to the President: Authority to Reduce Ex-
penditures, Bureau of the Budget, Oct. 1961, reprinted in 1973
Hearings, supra note 19, at 338, 339.
78. The Counsel to President Kennedy concluded a memorandum of
October 1961, by stating: "Previous Presidents, in their roles as
Commander-in-Chief, have 'impounded' Defense appropriations.
Similar action in the civilian area is not customary and of doubtful
legal basis." Quoted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 333 (testimony
of Senator Kennedy).
79. E.g., in fiscal year 1958, President Eisenhower asked agency heads to
delay and reduce expenditures to avoid the possibility of having to
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penditure of funds for numerous civilian projects: He impounded
agricultural appropriations, highway trust funds, education funds,
and funds appropriated for flood control projects, low-cost hous-
ing and other programs. 0
President Johnson undoubtedly felt that impoundments relating
to domestic projects were legally sanctioned. In 1967, Acting At-
torney General Ramsey Clark opined that the impoundment of
highway trust funds81 was lawful;8 2 and the Comptroller General
agreed. 8   Budget Director Schultze maintained that it was the
"general power of the President to operate for the welfare of the
economy and the Nation in terms of combating inflationary pres-
sures... . ." And the Director implied that withholding the high-
way funds would help put the brakes on inflation.8 4 Accordingly,
President Johnson refused to release for obligation billions of dollars
which were appropriated for federal aid to highway construction
projects. He did not, however, terminate any existing highway or
other domestic projects; nor did he refuse to acknowledge the po-
litical realities of his day and the potentially explosive crisis over
separation of powers which comes to lime-light whenever a Presi-
dent refuses to spend significant portions of funds which have re-
ceived the imprimatur of Congress.
III. NIXON ADMINISTRATION IMPOUNDMENTS
Testifying before a Senate committee on February 6, 1973, Dep-
uty Attorney General Joseph T. Sneed maintained, in reference to
impoundment practices over the past 30 years, that "such a long-
continued executive practice, in which Congress has generally ac-
quiesced, carried with it a strong presumption of legality."8 5 Ear-
borrow money which would exceed the statutory limit on the na-
tional debt; and, in 1959, withholdings involved an attempt to obtain
a two per cent reduction in federal employment levels in order to
absorb increased pay costs. There is no evidence which suggests that
these deferrals of expenditures, or the temporary withholdings made
during President Kennedy's administration, terminated any con-
gressionally approved project or that they were made for any reason
other than to "execute the laws" by recognizing the national debt
limits and the actual provisos of the Anti-Deficiency Acts.
80. See Fisher II, supra note 62, at 371-72.
81. See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970).
82. 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN., No. 32 (1967). See discussion at notes 88-117 and
accompanying text infra.
83. Decision B-160891, Feb. 24, 1967 (unreported), reprinted in 1971
Hearings, supra note 6, at 65.
84. Hearings on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1968 Before the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 111 (1967).
85. 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 359. To appreciate the tenor of the
hearings, one should note that Mr. Sneed earlier alleged that he
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lier in the same hearings Roy L. Ash, then Director-Designate of
OMB, suggested that upon consideration "of all the applicable his-
torical precedents, facts and statutes-including appropriations
acts, past statutory spending ceilings, the limit on the public debt
and the Antideficiency Act-action in reserving funds from time
to time is fully consistent with the President's constitutional du-
ties."86 Moreover, at a news conference held on January 31, 1973,
President Nixon asserted that his "constitutional right" to impound
funds was "absolutely clear."87 In order to ascertain the extent to
which statements such as these are legally viable and to determine
whether an "impoundment crisis" currently exists, and, if so, how
deep it cuts, two recent court decisions and other events pertaining
to the impoundment of appropriated funds must be reviewed.
A. Highway Trust Fund Case
In early April, 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit became the highest court in the nation ever to de-
cide a case directly dealing with the legal propriety of executive
impoundments. The case was Missouri Highway Commission v.
Volpe.88 The issue before the court was whether the Secretary of
Transportation could refuse or defer authority to obligate highway
funds which had been apportioned to Missouri when the reasons
given for impoundment by the Secretary and the OMB Director
pertained to the status of the economy and the need to control in-
flationary pressures.89 In affirming the judgment of the district
court, the court of appeals held that the highway funds could not
be lawfully impounded for the reasons asserted.9 0 The case did not
raise or settle, however, any constitutional question on whether
the Congress can direct the executive branch to spend appropri-
ated funds.
went "equipped with a copy of the Constitution" whereupon Senator
Ervin chided, "I really am glad to know there is somebody in the
executive branch who has a copy ....." Id. at 358.
86. Id. at 271.
87. The President's statement was as follows:
The constitutional right for the President of the United States
to impound funds and that is not to spend money, when the
spending of money would mean either increasing prices or
increasing taxes for all the people, that right is absolutely
clear.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1973, at 20, col. 6 (city ed.).
88. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), affg 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
For further discussion of this case, see Impoundment, supra note 5, at
1524-27.
89. 479 F.2d at 1103.
90. Id. at 1118.
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Since President Johnson began the practice in November of
1966, 91 huge amounts of highway funds have been withheld from
obligation. The instant case arose when the State Highway Com-
mission of Missouri filed a complaint in August of 1970 seeking the
restoration of approximately $26 million in contract authority for
fiscal year 1971.92 According to Secretary of Transportation Volpe,
ample moneys were in the trust fund; but, in his view, the "law in-
vest [ed] in him discretion to withhold from time to time authority
for Missouri to obligate its unexpended apportionments. '93  The
Secretary argued that (1) appropriations acts are permissive in na-
ture and do not mandate the expenditure of funds authorized to be
apportioned, (2) states have no vested rights in the appropriated
funds until he approves arrangements for expenditures, and (3)
the language of section 15 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, ex-
pressing a congressional desire that the funds not be impounded,
is precatory.9 4  The Eighth Circuit, Judge Stephenson dissenting,
found the arguments unavailing.
In Missouri Highway Commission the court assumed, arguendo,
that it might be true that appropriations acts are permissive in na-
ture but opined that such a proposition "does not provide a bot-
tom on which to premise either a direct or implied authoriza-
tion"95 for the impoundment of the highway funds. Judge Lay,
writing for the split court, continued:
For although a general appropriation act may be viewed as not
providing a specific mandate to expend all of the funds appropri-
ated, this does not a fortiori endow the Secretary with the au-
thority to use unfettered discretion as to when and how the monies
may be used.96
91. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 59 (testimony of Federal Highway
Administrator Turner).
92. Shortly after the original complaint was filed, the Highway Com-
mission was notified that it would be allowed to obligate the full
amount. Hence, the Commission filed an amended complaint to
pursue claims for fiscal year 1973 and after. On June 15, 1972, four
days prior to trial, Missouri was notified that it could obligate all
funds apportioned for fiscal 1973. 479 F.2d at 1104 nn.4 & 5. Hence,
the writ of mandamus granted by the district court ordering the
release of $80 million in fiscal 1973 funds, 347 F. Supp. at 953-54, was
vacated as moot by the circuit court. 479 F.2d at 1104, 1118.
93. 347 F. Supp. at 953.
94. 479 F.2d at 1108-09.
95. Id. at 1109.
96. Id. Judge Stephenson, citing the Anti-Deficiency Act, approached the
problem somewhat differently-putting the onus on Congress: "[I]n
the absence of specific statutory language to the contrary, Congress
has given the Executive branch the power to withhold authorized but
unobligated funds from expenditure." Id. at 1120. The dissenter
attempted to lend credence to this assertion by noting that Congress
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By taking such a position, the court tacitly adopted the view that
the intent of Congress should normally be dispositive, i.e., when
permissive language is used, that does not, eo ipso, create a pre-
sumption that executive discretion over "whether and when" of the
expenditure of funds is without limitationT The district 98 and
circuit 0 courts, moreover, found that it was the intent of Congress
to prohibit the President from withholding funds for purposes not
related to the highway program In the district court opinion, Chief
Judge Becker maintained that
[a]nticipating the possibility of executive or administrative im-
poundment or withholding of the apportioned Fund for legally im-
permissible reasons, Congress undertook to avoid such unauthor-
ized action by making its intent clear and unambiguous in para-
graph (c) of § 101 of Title 23 .... 100
The original Federal-Aid Highway Act01° did not contain spe-
cific language which would compel the executive branch to expend
funds. However, soon after Acting United States Attorney General
Clark held that the executive branch could withhold funds from
obligation,10 2 Congress amended the Act by adding paragraph (c)
to section 101 of Title 23 of the United States Code. The added sec-
tion provides:
It is the sense of Congress that under existing law no part of any
sums... shall be impounded or withheld from obligation.., by
any officer or employee of the executive branch of the Federal
had made several attempts to make it unlawful to impound the high-
way funds, and it was reasoned that such attempts demonstrated
that Congress itself thought that the President had the authority to
impound funds in the absence of such legislation. Id. at 1119 n.1,
1120 n.3.
97. See notes 39-52 and accompanying text supra.
In 1971, Justice William H. Rehnquist, then an Assistant Attorney
General in Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department, stated:
"l[T]o find a mandatory intent on the part of Congress, it is not a
question of looking for the word 'shall' as opposed to 'may.'" 1971
Hearings, supra note 6, at 234. Rehnquist suggested that if Congress
used mandatory language the intent would be clear and, where ex-
penditures were for domestic programs, the President could not law-
fully ignore the language. And it was further indicated that, in the
absence of specific mandatory language, all the laws, including the
Anti-Deficiency Act and statutory debt limitations, must be considered
to ascertain whether "the intent of Congress was to mandate the
spending...." Id. at 235.
98. 347 F. Supp. at 952-53.
99. 479 F.2d at 1112-14, 1116.
100. 347 F. Supp. at 952-53.
101. Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 462, 70 Stat. 378.
102. 42 Op. ATT'y GEN., No. 32 (1967). It was suggested that an appropria-
tion act "does not constitute a mandate" to spend but, rather, "places
an upper and not a lower limit on expenditures." Id. at 4, 5.
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Government, except such specific sums as may be deter-
mined by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with
the Secretary of Transportation, are necessary to be withheld from
obligation for specific periods of time to assure that sufficient
amounts will be available in the Highway Trust Fund to defray
the expenditures which will be required to be made from such
funds.103
It is generally held that language such as that used in section
101(c) is not mandatory.104 Accordingly, the Secretary of Trans-
portation argued in Missouri Highway Commission that the lan-
guage was horatory and that Congress had expressly refused to
enact proscriptive language of a mandatory nature and, thus, left
the executive branch with impoundment authority.1 5
The circuit court found this argument faulty in two respects.
Most importantly, the court indicated that the argument missed
the fundamental issue of the case. The Constitution gave the au-
thority to establish roads to Congress; and, although the Congress
had given the Secretary of Transportation some discretion to ap-
prove state highway programs, 10 6 the Federal-Aid Highway Act
also set out "detailed considerations to guide the Secretary's ac-
tion"' 07-beyond which the Secretary had no discretion without au-
thority from Congress which could be "gleaned from the language
of the Act itself."'' 0 8 Secondly, the Missouri Highway Commission
court found that the language of section 101 (c) "corroborates what
... the statute as a whole already provides-that apportioned
funds are not to be withheld from obligation for purposes totally
unrelated to the highway program."'1 9  Observing that the Act
had given the Secretary discretionary authority which expressly
included a limited authority to withhold funds," 0 the court of ap-
103. 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
104. 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 84 (testimony of Professor Bickel).
Senator Ervin added, "It is sort of like what we used to call pref-
atory language in the will." Id.
105. 479 F.2d at 1111.
106. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. §§ 105, 106, & 109 (1970).
107. 479 F.2d at 1112.
108. Id. at 1111. The circuit court quoted Richards v. United States, 369
U.S. 1, 11 (1962), which called for courts to look to the whole law,
its object and purpose, in interpreting legislation. See also Connecticut
Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945); Thompson v.
Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
109. 479 F.2d at 1116.
110. Section 209(g) of the Act, 70 Stat. 400, authorizes the withholding
of obligational authority if the Secretary of the Treasury determines
that amounts available in the fund "will be insufficient to defray
expenditures which will be required as a result of the apportionment
to the States of the amounts authorized .... " That is, the Act
guards against depletion of the funds,
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peals remarked that "[w]here Congress has consistently made ex-
press its delegation of a particular power, its silence is strong evi-
dence that it did not intend to grant the power.""'
The conclusion that the "sense of Congress" language was not
precatory when examined with the entire statute was firmly sup-
ported by a House Report"12 issued in 1970 when the Act was
amended further. There it was emphasized that it was the intent
of Congress that the highway funds not be impounded."L3 More-
over, the language "[i] t is the sense of Congress that under existing
law""14 was "legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute
[and] entitled to great weght in statutory construction,"" 65 the
Missouri Highway Commission court stated.
After dispensing with the arguments of the Secretary of Trans-
portation,"16 the appellate court discussed the applicability of the
Anti-Deficiency Act," 7 which was not argued on appeal, and af-
111. 479 F.2d at 1114, quoting Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Federal Maritime
Comnm'n, 348 F.2d 756, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
112. H.R. REP. No. 1554, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), in 1970 U.S. CoD.
CONG. & AD. NEws 5392.
113. Members of the House declared:
The withholding of highway trust funds as an anti-inflationary
measure is a clear violation of the intent of Congress as
expressed [in 23 U.S.C. § 101 (c) 1970)]. We again wish to
emphasize the clear legislative intent that funds apportioned
shall not be impounded or withheld from obligation ....
Id. at 5401. Cf. 37 Op. ATu'Y GEN. 546 (1934). See also Tus 1973
JOMT EcoNoMIc REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 90, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1973).
114. 23 U.S.C. § 101 (c) (1970) (emphasis added).
115. 479 F.2d at 1116, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
116. The court discarded in one paragraph the contention that states have
no vested interest in the funds. See note 94 and accompanying text
supra. Secretary Volpe had contended that 23 U.S.C. § 106(a), which
states that the Secretary's approval is a prerequisite to the obligation
of funds, made expenditures permissive. The court of appeals re-
torted:
Assuming arguendo that the states have no vested right in
the funds until such time as the Secretary approves the specific
projects we fail to see that this provides a basis for finding
that the Secretary has lawful discretion to withhold his
approval of projects for reasons not contemplated within
the Act.
479 F.2d at 1109-10 (original emphasis).
117. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (1970). See note 53 and accompanying text
supra. In Missouri Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, the court of appeals
pointed out that the reserves which, pursuant tQ the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act, could be established "to effect savings," etc., were au-
thorized only when the funds "will not be required to carry out
the purposes of the appropriation concerned .... " 479 F.2d at 1119,
quoting 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (1970) (original emphasis). The court
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firmed the declaratory and injunctive relief granted by the district
court.
The court's decision in Missouri Highway Commission enhances
the "sharing of power,""" for, although no constitutional question
is directly at issue, the case treats of an instance in which legisla-
tive intent has been clearly abrogated by executive action. The
rationale of the court of appeals provides a well-reasoned basis
for resolving this conflict over the purse-strings to the highway
funds.
B. Water Pollution Control Act Case
On May 8, 1973, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia decided the nation's second impoundment case of
major importance. In City of New York v. Ruckelshaus'"0 plain-
tiffs were granted summary judgment in a class action which was
brought to compel the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to allot among the states the total amounts authorized to be ap-
propriated by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972.120
Unlike the Highway Trust Fund case, 1 21 the instant case did not
involve the executive branch's refusal to expend funds. In Ruckel-
shaus, the impoundment practice which was successfully challenged
was the refusal of the EPA, at the President's direction,122 to allot
$5 billion of $11 billion authorized 123 for fiscal years 1973 and 1974.
And the EPA maintained that discretionary authority over the al-
lotting of funds was clearly intended by Congress.1 24
The outcome of the case was predictable, however, because the
EPA incorrectly characterized the issue before the court and un-
wittingly quoted for the court's consideration portions of debates
which, rather than supporting the EPA's position, tended to give
suggested that the impoundments made by the Secretary of Trans-
portation and the OMB Director were violative of the "purposes and
objectives" of the Federal-Aid Highway Act and, hence, were not
sanctioned by the Anti-Deficiency Act.
118. See R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960); see generally
Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); Forkosch, The Separation of Powers,
41 U. COLO. L. REV. 520 (1969).
119. 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973).
120. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
121. Missouri Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1049 (8th Cir. 1973),
aff'g 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
122. See 37 Fed. Reg. 26,282, § 35.910-1(a) (1972).
123. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1287 (Supp. 1973).
124. 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 403-10 (colloquy between EPA Ad-
ministrator Ruckelshaus and Senator Muskie).
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credence to the plaintiff's argument. The Act, as passed on Octo-
ber 18, 1972, over the President's veto, clearly mandated the allot-
ment of funds,1 25 although the EPA Administrator was given some
discretion with regard to the obligation of the funds after allot-
ment. The EPA, however, relied upon the remarks of Representa-
tives Harsha and Ford which pertained to certain minor amend-
ments which were made in order to give the executive branch some
discretion over obligational authority. 1 26  And the President, in
his veto message, recognized that such discretion existed: "[The
bill confers] a measure of spending discretion and flexibility upon
the President, and if forced to administer this legislation I mean
to use those provisions to put the brakes on budget-wrecking ex-
penditures .... ,,127
In Ruckelshaus, Judge Gasch recognized that the President did
not exercise "those provisions" which gave him discretion. The
President had instead directed the EPA Administrator not even to
allot the funds-an act the court found to be a purely ministerial
duty.128 It remains to be decided whether the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act funds must be spent, as that issue, to reiterate,
was not before the court in City of New York v. Ruckelshaus.12 9
125. The Act provides:
Sums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 1287
of this title for each fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972,
shall be allotted by the Administrator not later than January
1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for
which authorized, except that the allotment for fiscal year
1973 shall be made not later than 30 days after October 18,
1972. Sums shall be allotted among the States by the Ad-
ministrator ....
33 U.S.C.A. § 1285 (a) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
126. Representative Harsha, who sponsored the amendments, stated: "[I]n-
sertion of the phrase 'not to exceed' in section 207 [33 U.S.C.A. §
1287 (Supp. 1973)] was intended by the managers of the bill to
emphasize the President's flexibility to control the rate of spending."
118 CONG. REc. H9122 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (emphasis added). "The
language is not a mandatory requirement for full obligation and
expenditure up to the authorization .... " Id. at H9123 (remarks of
Representative Ford) (emphasis added). See also First Nat'l Bank
of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1966), in-
dicating the importance of considering the views of the sponsors of
legislation.
127. 118 CONG. Rzc. H10266 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) (emphasis added).
128. The fact that the making of allotments was a purely ministerial act
was, it appears, never openly acknowledged by the executive branch.
EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus, in referring to the congressional de-
bates, correctly stated, "[W]hat they had intended was that the
President have authority to limit the spending." 1973 Hearings, supra
note 19, at 406. Nevertheless, he was unwilling to admit that manda-
tory allotments were something less than expenditures.
129. If the impoundment issue vis-A-vis the actual expenditure does aris%
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Nevertheless, the case did establish that Congress can validly com-
mand that the executive branch "shall allot;" and, to a limited ex-
tent at least, the case thus suggests, as Missouri Highway Com-
mission expressly found, that the power of the purse is in fact
where the Constitution placed it-in Congress.
C. Other Impoundments And Reactions
In the eyes of many United States Senators and Representatives,
the impoundment practice most anathematic to democratic ideals
has been that which has threatened to completely terminate pro-
grams. Congress has viewed the terminations, and threatened
terminations, as a last-ditch effort by President Nixon to impose
his will at a point in the law-making process where Congress can
do little about it, absent specific controls which will encompass the
penumbra of the spending process. The President who has had
more vetoes overridden than any other President in history has,
the Ninety-third Congress believes, attempted to achieve by exec-
utive fiat that which he could not by the veto. Congress has en-
visaged the President's actions as constituting a direct challenge to
the system of checks and balances and has responded with un-
precedented, though sometimes intermittent, zeal.
1. Rural Electrification Loans
On December 29, 1972, the Department of Agriculture an-
nounced'3 0 that, beginning on January 1, 1973, all Rural Electrifica-
tion Act ("REA") 131 loans would be made as guaranteed and in-
sured loans under the Rural Development Act ("RDA") of 1972.132
This "conversion" from one loan program to another effectively
terminated REA two per cent loans' 33 and made loans available
only at somewhat higher interest rates and under more stringent
qualification standards. 3 4
Missouri Highway Comm'n may control. Although the legislative
history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 makes it clear that the executive branch was to have some
discretion over expenditures, the debates do not suggest that impound-
ments would be sanctioned for purposes not relating to the Act.
130. Rural Electric and Rural Telephone Loan Programs Change, Dep't of
Agriculture Press Release (Dec. 29, 1972), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
91, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
131. 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970).
132. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1921 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
133. The Rural Electrification Act of 1936 provides: "[A]Il such loans shall
be self-liquidating within a period of not to exceed thirty-five years,
and shall bear interest at the rate of 2 per centum per annum...
7 U.S.C. § 904 (1970).
134. Under Secretary of Agriculture J. Phil Campbell succintly described
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Congress found the REA two per cent loan termination to be
a direct affront: (A) The language of the Rural Electrification
Act of 1936 made mandatory the allotment of funds.13 r (B) De-
spite impoundments, Congress evidenced its intent, by persistently
increasing the appropriations, that the two per cent loan program
be expanded. 3 6 (C) By enacting the Rural Development Act of
1972, Congress clearly did not wish to replace REA loans. 3 7 More-
over, the ordered "conversion" from REA to RDA loans indu-
bitably ran afoul of the Reorganization Act of 1949.18 The Reor-
ganization Act does give the President the authority to initiate the
termination of agency functions; but it does not allow him to abol-
ish a function without first submitting a reorganization plan to
Congress, which then has 60 days to reject such a plan unless it
wishes to allow it to become effective. 39 No reorganization plan,
however, was ever submitted to Congress.
At first Congress reacted vigorously to the REA loan termina-
tion: On January 18, 1973, a measure which was designed to man-
date the complete restoration of the loan program was introduced
in the House of Representatives.1 40 Within less than two months,
the Department of Agriculture's strenuous objections to the pow-
erfully-worded measure resulted in a compromise, of sorts, which
some of the Rural Development Act's restrictive features: "[T]he Act
requires a finding of no credit elsewhere; mandatory refinancing; com-
ment by various planning agencies and local public bodies; and review
by the Secretary of Labor." H.R. REP. No. 91, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 5
(1973).
135. E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 903(c) & (d) (1970), respectively provided that "sums
herein made available or appropriated [for rural electrification] shall
be allotted yearly by the Administrator for loans" and that "such
annual sums shall be available .. .in the several States .... ." See
Arnold & Porter Memorandum, supra note 18, at 24-30.
The Memorandum pointed out that the language quoted above is
similar to language found in legislation dealing with aid to impacted
schools and in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which
former Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist relied upon in conclud-
ing that expenditures under the Acts were mandatory. Id. at 37 n.9,
citing 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 279, 285.
136. See S. REP. No. 983, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1972).
137. "The Rural Development Act was not designed for that purpose and
was never intended by the Congress to be used in such fashion." H.R.
Rap. No. 91, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973). A principal spokesman for
the RDA, Senator Talmadge remarked during debates, "We seek here
not to duplicate or supersede.., other programs but to supplement
and strengthen them." 118 CONG. REC. S13930 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1972).
See Arnold & Porter Memorandum, supra note 18, at 39-47.
138. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1970).
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 902(2), 903(a) (2), 906(a) (1970).
140. H.R. 2276, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 119 CONG. REc. H359 (daily
ed. Jan. 18, 1973).
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met all but three of the Department's criticisms. 141 But that was
not enough, and the bill which President Nixon signed into law1 42
on May 11, 1973, was indeed a temperate measure.
Although the final compromise included an agreement 4 3 that
"not less than" $105 million would be available at the two per cent
rate for new loans beginning in fiscal 1974, the measure contained
no language mandating the expenditure of funds. Moreover, the
REA Administrator was given unprecedented discretion in deter-
mining whether criteria is met for obtaining the loans. In a word,
Congress forgave the executive branch for attempting to com-
pletely abolish the loan program and, in return for the Secretary
of Agriculture's promise-in a letter-to make funds available for
at least three years, Congress agreed not to violate the Secretary's
"one cardinal principle"'144 by compelling him to do so.
2. Water And Waste Disposal Grants
On March 1, 1973, the House of Representatives passed, by a
vote of 297-54,145 a measure which the Senate approved three
weeks later by a vote of 66-22.14 6 The bill, H.R. 3298, was geared
to revive a water and sewer grant program administered by the
Farmers Home Administration ("FHA") of the Department of
Agriculture. Three months earlier that Department had an-
nounced 47 that the grant program had been terminated: The
funds appropriated in 1972 for the FHA water and sewer grant
funds had been impounded.
141. H.R. 5683, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 119 CONG. REC. H1847 (daily
ed. Mar. 15, 1973). The measure (a) retained mandatory provisions
of the loan program, (b) utilized the REA revolving fund rather than
the Rural Development Insurance Fund and (c) gave generation and
transmission loans the same treatment as other types of loans rather
than subject them to private market interest rates. The Agriculture
Department opposed all of these provisos. H.R. REP. No. 91, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 6, 33-39 (1973).
142. Pub. L. No. 93-32 (May 11, 1973). See generally H.R. REP. No. 169,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), the Conference Committee report on S.
394, the bill which passed.
143. See Letter from Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz to Representa-
tive W. R. Poage, May 8, 1973, in 119 CONG. REc. H3461 (daily ed. May
9, 1973).
144. Id.
145. 119 CONe. REC. H1284 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1973); see H.R. REP. No. 21,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
146. 119 CONG. REc. S5598 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1973); see S. REP. No. 77, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
147. Terminate FHA Water/Waste Disposal Grants, Dep't of Agriculture
Press Release (Jan. 10, 1973), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 21, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1973).
EXECUTIVE IMPOUNDMENT OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS 25
When Chairman Poage of the House Agriculture Committee
asked the executive branch to supply the legal basis for the termi-
nation of the grant program, the Agriculture Department's General
Counsel, John A. Knebel, suggested that refusal to spend was sanc-
tioned because the appropriation act was permissive: "[T]hat leg-
islation authorizes but does not require that the programs be car-
ried out by the Secretary."'148 Although the legal opinion upon
which the Department of Agriculture relied was at best decep-
tively phrased,149 Representative Poage's committee amended H.R.
3298 in such a way as to circumvent the legal basis used to justify
the termination of the water and sewer grant programs.
148. Id. at 1. General Counsel Knebel continued by quoting from "[m ] em-
oranda from the Department of Justice dealing with the question
insofar as it relates to funds appropriated for assistance to Federally
impacted schools and other education programs . ... " Id. at 2. Mr.
Knebel quoted for the Agriculture Committee remarks stating that it
was important to consider
whether the pertinent legislation compels the obligation and
expenditure of the full appropriation or leaves sufficient dis-
cretion to the Executive Branch to justify a Presidential
directive to impound.
A few general comments are in order. As we stated in our
previous memorandum, an appropriation is not in itself
ordinarily interpreted as a direction to spend. To determine
whether or not there is a duty to spend, one must examine the
substantive legislation.
Id., quoting Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General William
H. Rebnquist to Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the President,
Dec. 19, 1969, at 2. (For full reprints of both memoranda, see 1971
Hearings, supra note 6, at 279, 285).
149. The Department's General Counsel grossly mislead the Agriculture
Committee by selectively quoting from Mr. Rehnquist's memoranda.
The documents contained the following remarks which were not
called to the Committee's attention:
[W)e conclude that the President does not have a constitu-
tional right to impound [financial aid to federally impacted
schools] notwithstanding a Congressional direction that they
be spent. With respect to the suggestion that the President has
a constitutional power to decline to spend appropriated funds,
we must conclude that the existence of such a broad power is
supported by neither reason nor precedent.
1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 282.
The first memorandum of December 1, 1969, continued particularly
denouncing impoundments which could "defeat the Congressional in-
tent" due to permanent loss of funds. It was further noted that one
Attorney General, in an unpublished letter to President Franklin
Roosevelt, rejected "any idea that the President has any power to
refuse to spend appropriations other than such power as may be found
or implied in the legislation itself." Id. at 283. Making specific
reference to "not to exceed" language in one appropriation law, the
second memorandum of December 19, 1969, stated: "In the absence of
any positive evidence that the intended effect of this language is to
permit [allotment of] less than the full sum..., we would still view
these funds as not subject to impounding." Id. at 289.
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Very simply, the Agriculture Committee made mandatory the
expenditure of the appropriated funds. 50 And, as noted above,
the effort to mandate spending the funds was given overwhelming
approval in the House' 51 and Senate.152 On April 5, 1973, however,
Congress received a Catch-22 from the President: H.R. 3298 was
vetoed. The President indicated that the grant funds program was
duplicative of programs available through the EPA and revenue
sharing projects. Moreover, President Nixon declared that the
mandatory spending provisos gave rise to "grave constitutional
questons" because the mandate "conflict[ed] with the allocation of
executive power to the President made by Article II of the Constitu-
tion."'' 53 An agent of the executive branch had suggested that
funds could be impounded because the original Act had permis-
sive language, so Congress used mandatory language; 54 and then
150. H.R. 3298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306(a) (2) (1973), was revised from
"The Secretary is authorized to make grants aggregating not to ex-
ceed . . ." to "The Secretary shall make grants in the amounts in
appropriations Acts aggregating not to exceed .... ." The other
change deleted "may" and inserted "shall" in § 306 (a) (b). See H.R.
REP. No. 21, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973).
151. Representative Matsunaga declared that it was the intent of Congress
to "remove alleged ambiguous language in existing law, and substitute
therefore a clear mandate that rural water and waste grant funds ...
are to be expended .... ." 119 CONG. REc. H1276 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
1973). Representative Poage saw the administration's effort to ter-
minate the grant program as "a blatant infringement of congressional
authority," and called on Congress "not to sit idly by" and watch its
power "drift away." Id. at H1278. Representative O'Neill argued
that the discretionary authority allowed in the original Act had been
"blatantly abused." Id. at H1281. Representative Randall quoted
General Counsel Knebel's opinion and then remarked, "[T] he Congress
is faced with no choice but to act to remove the discretionary features
[and to insert] such mandatory language as 'shall.'" Id. at H1284.
152. 119 CONG. REc. S5560-78 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1973) (remarks of Senator
McGovern); id. at S5578 (remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at S5582,
S5588 (remarks of Senator Aiken); id. at S5590-91 (remarks of Senator
McClellan). Senator Carl T. Curtis and Senator Roman L. Hruska of
Nebraska voted against H.R. 3298, reasoning that funds administered
through the Environmental Protection Agency and the revenue sharing
program could best fulfill the need for the water and waste disposal
facilities. Id. at S5579, S5590.
153. 1973 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 863-64. But cf. Memorandum from
Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats to Senator Warren Magnuson,
Nov. 6, 1972, reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 740, con-
cluding that expenditures under NDEA Title I1 are mandatory.
154. It seems appropriate to note that the memorandum, authored by then
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, which the Department of Agri-
culture quoted, in justification of impounding the water and sewer
grant funds, contained this caveat: "It is in our view extremely diffi-
cult to formulate a constitutional theory to justify a refusal by the
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the President vetoed the measure in part due to the mandatory lan-
guage. The House of Representatives, with some reluctance, sus-
tained the veto.155
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Executive impoundment of appropriated funds did not begin
during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. In fact, the practice
has a history at least 170 years old.15 6 Although President Grant
frustrated the will of Congress by refusing to spend funds in 1876,
massive impoundments did not take place until the economic crisis
precipitated by depression and war in the 1930s and 1940s. After
that, Presidents continued to withhold large sums, usually funds
relating to foreign policy and defense priorities. President John-
son altered the traditional rationale for impounding funds, how-
ever, by taking into account a factor unrelated to his powers as
Commander-in-Chief or to the goals of the Anti-Deficiency Act.
President Johnson impounded funds to undercut inflationary pres-
sures. Under the next President, the practice of impoundment
changed even more.
President Nixon has continued to use the impoundment of funds
as a device to reduce inflationary pressures, although the courts
may completely halt such a practice. 157 The major development
to evolve within recent years, however, has been the utilization of
impoundment as a tool with which to effectuate the alteration of
domestic priorities. The attempted termination of the IREA two
per cent loan program and other domestic projects55 and the ac-
President to comply with a Congressional directive to spend." 1971
Hearings, supra note 6, at 283.
155. 119 CONG. REC. H2551 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1973).
156. See 13 ANNALs or CONG. 414 (1803), where President Jefferson an-
nounced that he was not spending full sums appropriated. But cf.
1973 Hearings, supra note 19, at 676-77, where Professor Cooper of Rice
University substantiated that President Jefferson spent the funds with-
in one year. Representative Pickle has made the same argument with
respect to the 1803 impoundment. Hearings on Impoundment Report-
ing and Review Before the House Comm. on Rules, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 97 (1973).
157. See Missouri Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1049 (8th Cir. 1973),
aff'g 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972); City of New York v. Ruckels-
haus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973). See also 119 CONG. REc. E5659-62
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1973), where all recent impoundment cases are
cited and concisely summarized.
158. Acting Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO")
Howard J. Phillips, at President Nixon's direction, began to dismantle
the OEO immediately after the President submitted his 1974 Budget
Message to Congress on January 29, 1973. The message requested that
no funds be appropriated for OEO in fiscal 1974; and, on the same day,
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tual termination of the FHA water and waste disposal grant pro-
gram epitomize a propensity of the President to alter congression-
ally sanctioned domestic priorities to conform to his notions about
what the nation needs and how those needs should be met.
In fairness to the President, one must recognize that it usually
devolves upon him to keep inflation checked, to keep spending be-
low the statutory debt limit, and to prevent waste. To conclude
that such burdens make it incumbent on the President to dras-
tically cut or terminate programs does not necessarily follow. And
the Ninety-third Congress has forcefully been made aware that
executive impoundments used to reorder priorities are checks on
the legislative branch which have no corresponding checks and
have, hence, led to an imbalance in the law-making process.
Congress has attempted to regain control of the purse-strings. 159
The most recent legislative move to curb the President's impound-
ment of appropriated funds is a measure which would require the
President to submit a special message to both Houses of Congress
within ten days after he impounds or authorizes any person to im-
Acting Director Phillips issued memoranda to all Community Action
Agencies, see 42 U.S.C. § 2790 (1970), instructing grantees to begin to
phase out their programs. On March 15, 1973, further instructions
were given in OEO Instruction 6730-3: CAA's were required to submit
phase-out plans and budgets, and failure to submit an acceptable plan
was to result in summary suspension and the stoppage of financial
assistance from OEA.
Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emp. v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60
(D.D.C., 1973), granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The
court found the procedures utilized in the attempted termination to be
violative of the Reorganization Act of 1949, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-13 (1970),
and the Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2837, 29716 (Supp. 1973), and to be clearly at odds with a con-
gressional intent that the programs continue. However, the decision
infers that termination may be acceptable if the procedural require-
ments are met.
159. S. 518, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), would have made the Director and
Deputy Director of the OMB subject to Senate confirmation. The
House passed the measure on May 1, 1973, by a vote of 229-171. 119
CONG. REc. H3228 (daily ed. May 1, 1973). The Senate passed the bill
by a vote of 73-19. Id. at S8232 (daily ed. May 3, 1973). President
Nixon vetoed S. 518 because, in his view, to enact the measure would
be "a grave violation of the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers." The President alluded to the fact the bill would abolish the
OMB and immediately recreate it in order to make the current Director
and Deputy Director subject to Senate approval. Id. at S9375 (daily
ed. May 21, 1973). The Senate overrode the President's veto by a
66-22 vote. Id. at S9606 (daily ed. May 22, 1973). The House sustained
the veto by a vote of 236-178, 40 votes short of the two-thirds needed to
override. Id. at H3920 (daily ed. May 23, 1973).
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pound funds for any reason.160 The bill, S. 373, was passed by the
Senate on May 10, 1973,161 and sent to the House where it was
amended and passed on July 25, 1973.162 The Senate disagreed
with the House amendments and appointed Senate conferees.'
6 3
The House also appointed conferees, including Representative Mar-
tin of Nebraska.16 4 Both the Senate and House proposals would
require the President to set out in his message the period of time
during which funds are to be withheld, the reasons for the action
and probable effects of the impoundment. 165 The Senate and
House proposals differ on the most important provision of the
measure. Section 3 of the Senate proposal provides that the Pres-
ident, and other executive branch officials, "shall cease the im-
pounding" within 60 calendar days after the impoundment mes-
sage is received by Congress, unless Congress ratifies the impound-
ment by concurrent resolution, and it further stipulates that Con-
gress may, by concurrent resolution, direct that the impoundment
cease before the 60-day period has passed.166 The House proposal's
section 102, on the other hand, provides that any impoundment
"shall cease" if within 60 calendar days after the message is re-
ceived, the specific impoundment shall have been disapproved by
passage of a resolution of either House of Congress.1 67
Until Congress is able to regain control of the purse-strings,
libertarians should hope that whoever is President will adopt prac-
tices which do not flout the separation of power. To govern by
fiat is to tread beyond the rule of law and to retreat from demo-
cratic ideals.163 This does not mean that executive impoundment
of appropriated funds can never be within the purview of consti-
tutional precepts. It does suggest, however, that the executive
160. S. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
161. 119 CONG. REC. S8871 (daily ed. May 10, 1973). See id. at S6902 (daily
ed. Apr. 5, 1973) (remarks of Senator Hartke); see also 6 IND. L. REV.
523 (1973).
162. 119 CONG. REC. H6597-630 (daily ed. July 25, 1973). The House
amended the Senate bill by striking out all clauses of S. 373, as passed
by the Senate, and inserting in lieu thereof the provisions of H.R. 8480,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which earlier that day was passed by the
House.
163. 119 CONG. REC. S15194 (daily ed. July 31, 1973).
164. Id. at H7155 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1973).
165. Id. at S8872 (daily ed. May 10, 1973); id at H6628 (daily ed. July
25, 1973).
166. Id. at S8872 (daily ed. May 10, 1973).
167. Id. at H6629 (daily ed. July 25, 1973).
168. See Z. BARBU, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THEIR PSYCHOLOGY AND
PATTERNS OF LIFE 47-52, 144-45 (1956). W. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF
LIBERTY: THE RIGHTS OF MAN WITHOUT FORCE 102-05 (Pocket Cardinal
ed. 1964).
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branch should be able to clearly identify a valid constitutional or
legislative base' 69 for every refusal to spend funds for programs
which have received the imprimatur of Congress.
169. Authorization for presidential action "must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 379, 585 (1952). It is, of course, extremely
doubtful that any constitutional or legislative base can be found, except
for the Anti-Deficiency Acts, to justify the impoundment of funds.
Neither the Missouri Highway Comm'n nor the Ruckelshaus cases
hinted that a statutory base existed to justify impoundments of High-
way Trust Fund or pollution control monies, and none of the several
other recent impoundment decisions has recognized a statutory base.
See, e.g., Pealo v. FHA, No. 1028-73 (D.D.C., July 31, 1973); Massa-
chusetts v. Weinberger, No. 1308-73 (D.D.C., July 26, 1973); Com-
munity Action Programs Executive Directors Ass'n v. Ash, No. 899-73
(D.N.J., June 29, 1973); Pennsylvania v. Weinberger, No. 1125-73
(D.D.C., June 28, 1973). That there exists a constitutional base upon
which to justify impoundments is such tenuous assertion that the
government rarely alludes to it in litigation. Moreover, it has demon-
strated that such an alleged base is clearly nonexistent. See Waicu-
kauski, The Impoundment Crisis: The Role of the Courts and the
Constitution, June 1, 1973 (unpublished thesis in Harvard Law
Library); Note, Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories
and Political Realities, 61 GEO. L.J. 1295 (1973). In accord, another
piece which
examined the justifications . . . both constitutional and
statutory ... offered for [recent] impoundments [reached
the conclusion] that the only potentially valid ones arise when
particular impoundments are based on developments within
the affected program, as authorized by the Anti-Deficiency
Act, or on permissive language in the statute governing the
particular program itself.
Impoundment, supra note 5, at 1534.
